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KANTIANS MAKE BAD FRIENDS;
SUSPENDING MORAL RESPONSIBILITY IN RELATIONSHIPS
Abstract. In this essay, I will briefly examine the Kantian ethical tradition as inherited by
Christine Korsgaard. I argue that the Kantian is committed to a morally impractical conclusion:
that she must hold others morally responsible without exception. I explain the concept of
moral responsibility in the Kantian and consequentialist frameworks, and then illustrate why
the Kantian’s is an impractical imperative through an examination of its interpersonal effects.
I end by suggesting that a consequentialist view offers a more robust framework for moral
responsibility.
Keywords: moral responsibility, Korsgaard, Kant, relationships, consequentialism, blame, praise,
attitudes.
ДЛЯ ЦИТИРОВАНИЯ: Myers J. Kantians Make Bad Friends; Suspending Moral Responsibility in Rela-
tionships // Логико-философские штудии. 2021. Т. 19, №2. С. 123–126. DOi: 10.52119/LPHS.2021.
94.87.010.
Being a Kantian is difficult for a multitude of reasons, but one in particular is the
standard to which you must treat the people in your life. In this essay, I will briefly
examine the Kantian ethical tradition as inherited by Christine Korsgaard and argue
that it commits her to a morally impractical conclusion – namely, that the Kantian
must be committed to holding people morally responsible without exception. I will
then illustrate why this is an impractical imperative by examining its interpersonal
effects and suggest that a consequentialist view offers a more robust framework for
moral responsibility.
Christine Korsgaard is perhaps the most renowned philosopher within the Kantian
tradition today—and for good reason. In her work, she introduces an interpretation of
the second formulation of Kant’s Categorical Imperative that is uniquely incisive. The
second formulation states that one must treat humanity (or every individual) as an end
in and of herself, never as a means to an end (Kant, Gregor 1785/1998: 4:429). As a
Kantian philosopher, Korsgaard accepts this imperative—and I will not be questioning
her overall acceptance of the Kantian moral view. Instead, I want to explore what
this imperative logically commits her to. Korsgaard insightfully extrapolates “treating
someone as an end” to treating her under the guise of being morally responsible, and in
this way, to respect their autonomy as an individual (Korsgaard 1992: 305–306, 311–
312, 317–319). I do not find fault with her interpretation—it is reasonable to assume
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that treating someone with respect is to treat her as if she is fully autonomous. The
next reasonable move is to assume that autonomy should be the sufficient condition
for moral responsibility.
It is the way in which Korsgaard accepts this imperative, though, that ties her to
a difficult conclusion. She accepts that holding individuals morally responsible follows
from the second formulation of the categorical imperative—an imperative that does
not permit of exceptions. The imperative is to “always and at the same time” hold
people responsible, so if one wishes to forgo this moral commandment, it cannot be
done from within a Kantian framework—it must come from outside the moral theory.
In order to examine what is so impractical about this conviction, it is first useful to
understand what “holding people morally responsible” entails. There are several philo-
sophical (and informal) notions of moral responsibility. On a consequentialist account,
to hold someone morally responsible would only be morally correct if it engendered
some positive benefits in them—i.e., to make one a better person, create closure for
the wronged party, or deter others from committing the same wrongful act (Dennett,
Caruso 2021: 6–7, 11). This is not the account Korsgaard wants to accept. Instead,
Korsgaard takes a largely attitudinal view of moral responsibility, saying that to hold
someone responsible is to react to her as we would an agent: to blame, praise, desire
vengeance for a wrongdoing, reciprocate good will, etc. It is, in large part, to treat
someone as they deserve to be treated, in a very common-sense understanding of the
term (Dennett, Caruso 2021: 11). It is not clear from her cited work if Korsgaard
has committed herself to a view on what is called desert-based moral responsibility,
wherein blame, or specifically punishment, is deserved in a deeper sense than being
justified by good consequences (Pereboom 2014: 2, in Dennett, Caruso 2021). Her
work speaks more about attitudes in interpersonal relationships than about actions,
specifically punishment.2 This narrows the focus to strictly attitudes that constitute
moral responsibility, expressed in interpersonal relationships.
Why is Korsgaard’s commitment an impractical one? The imperative to always
treat others as agentic appears innocuous, but I argue, only spuriously so. I believe
that the Kantian view of responsibility does not permit for the necessary, occasional
suspension of moral responsibility in relationships. The ironic aspect of this argument
is that Korsgaard herself explicitly states that these attitudes are themselves required
for interpersonal life (Korsgaard 1992: 305–306, 311–312). For her, interpersonal life
itself is only made possible through the application of these attitudes—and I have no
quarrels with that claim, but I argue that her entailment to apply these attitudes with-
out exception is problematic for the very relationships she hopes to maintain. My brief
rebuttal is to suggest that fully adhering to what we might call Korsgaard’s Categori-
cal Imperative vitiates the very interpersonal relationships she hopes to respect, thus
2Korsgaard does go on to provide examples of where we might suspend moral responsibility, but I
argue this is inconsistent with her acceptance of the Categorical Imperative. Recall that I am exploring
what a Kantian tradition logically commits oneself to, and why this is unreasonable.
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making her project self-defeating. Her theoretical moral grounds demand a practice
which, if carried out, would destroy the relationships it hoped to maintain. But I have
yet to demonstrate why I think this is true, and why another moral framework is more
pragmatic.
First, I will present two everyday examples in which adhering to the strict impera-
tive to always hold responsible creates interpersonal strife. These are examples where I
suggest the cost of indulging Kantian attitudes could be reasonably morally outweighed
by the benefits of their suspension in favor of consequentialist goods. But because the
Kantian does not have theoretical grounds for exempting such cases, I intimate that
a consequentialist view is more fitting, or at the very least, gives one more options
without betraying one’s moral principles.
Imagine you are at a family dinner for the holidays. Imagine you happen to be
an American family, and perhaps your uncle believes that Donald Trump did win the
November election, or that COVID vaccines have tracking devices in them. You are
confronted with a choice; you can respond to him as fully morally responsible, con-
fronting him about these questionable beliefs. Or, you can dispassionately assess your
situation—you will likely not persuade your uncle to change his mind and attempting
to do so will only ruin the dinner. Are you really going to stain the one time per year
you visit extended family?
You could also imagine that your sister has been absent in sharing her duties car-
ing for your sick mother. She lives an equal distance to your mother’s home, but has
been simply refusing to share the burden of taking care of her in her old age. You are
understandably angered by this capricious laziness, but the desire for deserved retri-
bution will only worsen the situation, putting your mother in an even more precarious
situation.
The problem with a Kantian commitment to the constant application of attitudinal
moral responsibility is that cases like these highlight the impracticality, and perhaps
impossibility, of such a commitment. If, however, one does suspend moral responsibility
and treat the person in question as an object to be accounted for, something in the
situation to be dealt with, one does this in spite of their moral duty. Thus, the Kantian
is forced to undertake an impossible standard or endorse the desultory suspension of
one’s moral principles.
If, however, one views these scenarios through a consequentialist framework, there
are more doors open to her. The consequentialist can weigh the costs and benefits of
the above scenarios, whereas the Kantian only has her imperative to react to people as
autonomous agents who deserve their just deserts.
The consequentialist can ask if arguing over politics at the Christmas family dinner
is really the wisest (or best consequences-producing) course of action. Perhaps merely
biting your tongue will be better for everyone involved, and to make this easier, you
might suspend all moral blame entirely, viewing your uncle as a component of the dinner
that you find challenging. In this way, he becomes an obstacle to a civil family dinner—
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something to be worked around, like a shortage of forks or sitting in uncomfortable
chairs.
The consequentialist can also take a removed approach towards her sister—even
though she might deserve blame and even retribution, you may treat her as something
to be accounted for or dealt with for your mother’s sake. You can simply remove
your sister from the situation without anger, malice, or blame in order to better your
mother’s conditions of care.
This is not to say that the consequentialist must always suspend moral responsibil-
ity, but it is a live option for her—without any inconsistencies with her larger moral
theory. The attitudes comprising moral responsibility are, as Korsgaard indicated,
generally essential for maintaining relationships. However, I hope to have illustrated
why the logical entailment to constantly hold to these attitudes would be damaging to
any relationship. And, it is you as well who must sometimes be the recipient of these
suspensions of interpersonal attitudes—sometimes you are the unreachable malcontent,
the unhinged partisan, or the indolent child. The suspension of moral responsibility
is a crucial and necessary part of nearly any relationship, at least from time to time.
It serves as a lubricant, allowing each party to exist more freely and deal with issues
caused by the other. In this way, a suspension of responsibility can be the very thing
that allows a relationship to stay intact with the future possibility for many more
legitimate applications of moral attitudes.
In this essay, I hope to have illuminated a standard to which no Kantian could com-
ply, and to have shown that this is not an issue with the moral agent, but rather with
the moral theory. There are cases in interpersonal life that simply require the suspen-
sion of moral attitudes, and a consequentialist framework can provide this scaffolding
without need for an inconsistency in its application.
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